>And so we are fairly broadly deployed software and where we enjoy administrative privileges in customer environments.
There is a lot of talk about shoring up security practices by many of the people quoted here. But something that would be hard to admit is that maybe they should not have administrative privileges in customer environments. Maybe they should not install agents on your machine. They would never recommend you to do so with anyone else, except them of course, because you can trust them.
I don't like the Solarwinds Linux agent. When I last looked, there was still an sh syntax error in the cron job it installed (look for a file named 1 in your root directory) and I couldn't reach anyone who could understand my bug report. It also frequently exhausted the space in its log partition. I replaced the agent with SNMP 3 read only access. I don't believe I'm authorized to describe my employer's current monitoring posture.
And you would think that a bit of analysis would be done on software and the company that built it for something that you install and give it full administrative control.
>And so we are fairly broadly deployed software and where we enjoy administrative privileges in customer environments.
There is a lot of talk about shoring up security practices by many of the people quoted here. But something that would be hard to admit is that maybe they should not have administrative privileges in customer environments. Maybe they should not install agents on your machine. They would never recommend you to do so with anyone else, except them of course, because you can trust them.