Separating controls from SW is a strange thing to do. The issue here is a culture of shortcuts and awful money-driven decisions, not any particular discipline, though delayed software fixes did cause more accidents, and it was poorly designed overall.
Ultimately, the MCAS relied on a single sensor, one which was known to fail, and only displayed the redundant sensor data - get this - if they bought the additional option to show when the sensor failed.
> However, whereas MCAS was activated automatically, without pilot action, the cockpit crew would have to notice and act on an AOA DISAGREE alert. Further, the AOA indicator and disagree alert were not standard equipment on the 737 MAX, although the AOA indicator had been on earlier models. Boeing offered them as “add ons” at additional cost
Without that "add on" you'd never know the MCAS was acting on faulty data. And all the while management worked overtime to mislead regulators on the potential impact of MCAS to avoid additional scrutiny and training requirements. So nobody knew the safety of their aircraft depended on that non-standard equipment package.
Yeah - total business and design mismanagement driven by greed.
> When I say I changed the culture of Boeing, that was the intent, so it’s run like a business rather than a great engineering firm. It is a great engineering firm, but people invest in a company because they want to make money. --Harry Stonecipher, 2004
I think that outsourcing was a symptom of this disease. Not MBA cancer, not poor software, not anything other than a deliberate cultural shift which led to all those other things.
>> When I say I changed the culture of Boeing, that was the intent, so it’s run like a business rather than a great engineering firm. It is a great engineering firm, but people invest in a company because they want to make money. --Harry Stonecipher, 2004
> I think that outsourcing was a symptom of this disease. Not MBA cancer, not poor software, not anything other than a deliberate cultural shift which led to all those other things.
That is the MBA cancer. Focusing on shareholder value instead of making a great product.
I've come to the conclusion that just like we require licenses and certain degrees to work on safety critical fields we should extend that to things you can't have in order to work for companies that do manufacturing, starting with MBA's are legally ineligible for hire at companies like Boeing.
Yeah, I suppose like the biological cancer, there's not a clear cause effect relationship between a reshaping culture, and then MBAs or "Ship-it" mentality taking over engineering oversight and scheduling. It's a runaway effect.
I tend to place more blame on a deliberate reshaping by the top individual, rather than some accidental metastasizing of the problem. I'm straining the analogy.
I've always seen the cancer as MBAs only hire MBAs, and that's how it grows. Its very difficult to get to a senior level in most organizations without an MBA.
Maybe the CEO in such cases often is an MBA and you are a bit talking about the same thing, just from different perspectives? (Looking at the one person, vs the people, at the top?)
> I have compiled the following for the 2021 Fortune 500 US companies (the last global one I've seen is from FT in 2015 https://ig.ft.com/sites/mba-to-ceo/):
> 43% of CEOs have an MBA
Anyway,what happens if the CEO is an engineer, and everyone reporting to him/her is an MBA :-)
Not arguing anything in particular, just want to point out it's not completely unusual to be both. Many of the top "Chief" positions I've worked under were former PhD engineers and researchers who went and got an MBA to move up. The legendary director of JPL, Charles Elachi, for example. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Elachi
And many of my former bosses.
Maybe that's a symptom of the same disease ("without mba you cannot rule"), but I think it doesn't necessarily mean an MBA holder is a bad candidate for leadership.
Ultimately, the MCAS relied on a single sensor, one which was known to fail, and only displayed the redundant sensor data - get this - if they bought the additional option to show when the sensor failed.
> However, whereas MCAS was activated automatically, without pilot action, the cockpit crew would have to notice and act on an AOA DISAGREE alert. Further, the AOA indicator and disagree alert were not standard equipment on the 737 MAX, although the AOA indicator had been on earlier models. Boeing offered them as “add ons” at additional cost
Without that "add on" you'd never know the MCAS was acting on faulty data. And all the while management worked overtime to mislead regulators on the potential impact of MCAS to avoid additional scrutiny and training requirements. So nobody knew the safety of their aircraft depended on that non-standard equipment package.
Yeah - total business and design mismanagement driven by greed.
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https://mitsloan.mit.edu/teaching-resources-library/boeings-...
> When I say I changed the culture of Boeing, that was the intent, so it’s run like a business rather than a great engineering firm. It is a great engineering firm, but people invest in a company because they want to make money. --Harry Stonecipher, 2004
I think that outsourcing was a symptom of this disease. Not MBA cancer, not poor software, not anything other than a deliberate cultural shift which led to all those other things.